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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

Constitution goes no further than the constitutional minimum
provided under federal precedent.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
76
Jay-Jay Cabaret, Inc. v. State
(decided April 4, 1995)

Plaintiff, Jay-Jay Cabaret, Inc., brought this action seeking a

declaratory judgment that one of the rules promulgated by the
New York State Liquor Authority (hereinafter "SLA") was
unconstitutional either on its face or as it was being applied to the

plaintiff.77 Plaintiff contend[ed] that the "six-foot" provision of
SLA Rule 36.1(s) 7 8 "violate[d] the freedom of expression of
dancers employed by plaintiff" 7 9 and was, therefore, violative of
81
both the United States 8 0 and the New York State Constitutions.
76. 164 Misc. 2d 673, 629 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1st Dep't 1995).
77. Id. at 675, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939. Plaintiff also raised another claim in
its original complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that Alcoholic Beverage
Law section 106(6) was unconstitutional, or in the alternative, a declaration
that "table dancing" did "not constitute a 'disorderly' condition" for the
purposes of section 106(6). Id. Plaintiff also sought a declaration that the use
of "liquid latex bras" did not violate SLA Rule 36.1(s). Id. In its proposed
amended complaint, plaintiff raised two additional theories: 1) "that Rule
36. l(s) was promulgated by the SLA without... or in excess of its authorized
power," and 2) "that Rule 36.1(s) violated Article HI, [section] 1 of the New
York State Constitution." Id. at 676, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939. The court granted
plaintiff's motion to amend. Id. at 676, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
78. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 53.1(s) (McKinney
1987). The "six-foot" provision provides that topless performers must be on a
platform eighteen inches above the floor level or higher and no less than six
feet from the nearest patron. Id.
79. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 680, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
80. U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law ...abridging the freedom of spech... ." Id.
81. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"[No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech...."
Id.
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Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. 82 Finding that a
determination of the constitutional question was unnecessary to
the resolution of the case, 83 the court denied defendants' motion
for summary judgment and declared SLA Rule 36.1(s) "null and
void" on the ground that the statutory authority for the rule was
84
lacking.
Plaintiff, Jay-Jay Cabaret, operates an establishment known as
"Flashdancers," located in New York, where the principal
business is topless entertainment. 85 Because Jay-Jay Cabaret also
serves alcoholic beverages on the premises, it is required to have
an alcoholic beverages license. All rules promulgated by the
SLA, such as the one in controversy in this case, apply to all
holders of alcoholic beverages licenses in New York State,
including plaintiff.
The specific rule in question in this case involves SLA Rule
36.1(s). This rule provides for the revocation or suspension of
the beverage license:
For suffering or permitting any female to appear on licensed
premises in such manner or attire as to expose to view any
portion of the breast below the top of the areola, or any
simulation thereof. The provisions of this subdivision shall not
apply to any female entertainer performing on a stage or
platform which is at least 18 inches above the immediate floor
level and which is removed at least six feet from the nearest
patron. 86
Plaintiff asserted that the practice of "table dancing," where the
dancers wear "liquid latex bras" and where the dancers are closer
to patrons than the six foot provision of SLA 36.1(s) would
permit, subjects them to liability, including potential revocation
of the liquor license. 87 Plaintiff, therefore, sought a declaration
in order to determine their prospective obligations in conforming
82. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 674, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
83. Id. at 680, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 674, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
86. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 53.1(s) (McKinney 1987).

The language of section 53 is identical to the language of SLA Rule 36.
87. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 675, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
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with this rule. 88 Jay-Jay Cabaret contended that the rule must be
struck down because SLA 36.1(s) was unconstitutionally applied
to plaintiff, or in the alternative the SLA was without the
89
authority to promulgate the Rule.
The court first looked to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Doran v. Salem Inn, 90 which held that topless
dancing was a form of expression and was to be afforded at least
limited protection under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 91 In Doran, three corporations, engaged in
the business of topless entertainment, challenged a local
ordinance banning topless dancing in the town of North
IHempstead, New York. 92 The corporations argued that the
ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 93 The
Supreme Court looked to its earlier decision, California v.
LaRue,94 which held that the States could regulate topless
dancing through their regulation of the sale of liquor, which is
provided for by the Twenty-First Amendment. 95 However,
because the ordinance in Doran applied to all establishments, not
merely those which serve liquor, the State could not rely upon
the power of the Twenty-first Amendment to limit the freedom of
expression conferred by the First Amendment. 96 In
distinguishing Doran from LaRue, the Court found that while
"the broad powers of the States to regulate the sale of
liquor... outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude

88. Id. at 676, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
89. Id. at 675-76, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939.

90. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
91. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 677, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (citing
Doran,422 U.S. at 932).
92. Doran, 422 U.S. at 924.

93. Id.
94. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
95. Id. at 114. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The Twenty First
Amendment provides for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Id. It has
been interpreted as conferring upon the States the broad power to regulate
"intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders."
LaRue, 409 U.S. at 114.
96. Doran, 422 U.S. at 932-33.
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dancing," 97 the ordinance in Doran was not limited to only those
establishments serving alcohol, and thus was constitutionally
overbroad. 98 Furthermore, the petitioner could not raise any
other "legitimate state interest that would counterbalance" the
respondents' constitutional claim. 99 Thus, the Jay-Jay Cabaret
court agreed with plaintiff's counsel and concluded that "[i]n
light of the Salem Inn opinion ... we would be precluded from

banning topless dancing unless hearings were held or a record
made establishing a clear and direct relationship between such
entertainment and Bacchanalian revelries and other sordid
behavior." 100

The court then considered whether such constitutional
protection would invalidate the SLA's proximity rule prohibiting
table dancing. 101 In Bellanca v. New York State Liquor
Authority, 102 the court of appeals addressed the question of
whether a state statute was "constitutional to the extent that it
absolutely prohibits liquor licensees from presenting nonobscene
topless dancing performances to willing customers under all
circumstances." 103 The Bellanca court held that neither the
legislature nor the SLA may ban such activity unless a sufficient
functional relationship is present. 104 That is, topless dancing
"may be regulated, even to the extent of its prohibition, in
circumstances so functionally related to the exercise of the State's
authority to regulate the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages as to overcome [New York State's] constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression." 105 The end result of
Bellanca was the striking down of section 106(6)(a) of the

97. Id. at 932.
98. Id. at 933-34.

99. Id. at 934.
100. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 679, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 942 (citation
omitted).
101. Id. at 680, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
102. 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429 N.E.2d 765, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1981).

103. Id. at 231, 429 N.E.2d at 766, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 236, 429 N.E.2d at 769, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
105. Id. at 231, 429 N.E.2d at 766, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
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Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, "the statutory counterpart of
subdivision (s)" of the rule challenged here. 106
Prior New York State cases, 107 on the subject of alcoholic
beverage laws regulating topless dancing, have held that the
fundamental distinction between freedom of expression under the
United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution

is the impact of the Twenty-First Amendment on the Federal
Constitutional

claim.

While both constitutions

provide

for

freedom of expression (including forms of expression such as
topless dancing), the First Amendment protections may be
modified or curtailed by the provisions of the Twenty-First
Amendment where alcohol is being regulated. 10 8 Since the SLA
has the power under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate the
conditions of the sale of alcoholic beverages, any resultant
regulation and/or prohibition of topless dancing in connection
with the sale of alcohol would probably be deemed constitutional
under the Federal Constitution. 109 Because the Twenty-first
Amendment does not apply to the New York State Constitution,
and there is no similar provision that infringes on freedom of
expression existing within the New York State Constitution, a
rule may be struck down as violative of the State Constitution,
even though it passes scrutiny under the United States
Constitution. 110
Here the court was able resolve the issues before it without
directly addressing the constitutionality of this particular statute
restricting topless dancing. Instead, it relied solely upon the
determination that the New York State Legislature did not grant
the SLA authority to promulgate a categorical rule such as Rule
36.1(s), thereby making it unnecessary to disturb prior holdings

106. 92-07 Restaurant, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 8O
A.D.2d 603, 604, 435 N.Y.S.2d 989, 992 (1981).
107. See, e.g., Bellanca, 54 N.Y.2d at 234-235, 429 N.E.2d at 768, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 90.
108. Id.
109. Doran, 422 U.S. at 932.
110. Bellanca, 54 N.Y.2d at 234-35, 429 N.E.2d at 768, 445 N.Y.S.2d at
90.
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regarding the constitutionality of topless dancing. 111 As Justice
Lowe stated, "although plaintiff has squarely raised the
constitutional issue of whether the SLA's six foot rule violates
the freedom of expression of dancers employed by plaintiff, it is
unnecessary for this Court to reach the merits of this
constitutional claim," since the SLA's rule was declared null and
void for lack of authority to promulgate it.112 As such, the court
enjoined the SLA's enforcement of Rule 36.1(s).
People v. Tolia1 13
(decided September 14, 1995)

Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of inciting
to riot1 1 4 during a concert 1 15 being held in Thompkins Square
111. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 680, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 942. The
court discussed in great detail that the instant case was very similar to Beer
Garden v. State Liquor Authority, 79 N.Y.2d 266, 590 N.E.2d 1193, 582
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1992), where the court struck down SLA Rule 36.1(q). Id. at
276, 590 N.E.2d at 1197, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 69. In striking down that rule, the
Beer Garden court found that "agencies are possessed of only those powers
expressly delegated by the Legislature, together with those powers required by
necessary implication." Id. Since the legislative history of subsections (q) and
(s) were the same, a determination that there was no authority to promulgate
subsection (q)
should also apply to subsection (s). Id. Hence the "six-foot" rule
should also be declared null and void. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 680,
629 N.Y.S.2d at 942. The Jay-Jay Cabaret court took this approach in
resolving this case but noted that its declaration was "without prejudice to repromulgation of said rule upon a showing of the requisite grant of appropriate
statutory authority and compliance with the relevant statutory provision." Id.
112. Id.
113. 631 N.Y.S.2d 632 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1995).
114. See PENAL LAw § 240.08 (McKinney 1992). This section provides in
pertinent part: "A person is guilty of inciting to riot when he urges ten or more
persons to engage in tumultuous and violent conduct of a kind likely to create
public alarm. Inciting to riot is a class A misdemeanor." Id. The grand jury
charged defendant with riot in the first degree, which states:
A person is guilty of riot in the first degree when (a) simultaneously
with ten or more other persons he engages in tumultuous [sic] and
violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates
a grave risk of causing public alarm, and (b) in the course of and as a
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